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Yes	 High	Altitude	 4.0000	 .00000	 5	
Low	Altitude	 4.5000	 .57735	 4	
Total	 4.2222	 .44096	 9	
No	 High	Altitude	 2.3333	 .57735	 3	
Low	Altitude	 2.6667	 .57735	 3	
Total	 2.5000	 .54772	 6	
Total	 High	Altitude	 3.3750	 .91613	 8	
Low	Altitude	 3.7143	 1.11270	 7	














Crew	training	provided	 Mean	 Std.	Deviation	 N	
Yes	 4.5000	 .57735	 4	
No	 2.6667	 .57735	 3	






















11.400a	 3	 3.800	 17.914	 .000	 .830	 53.743	 1.000	
Intercept	 163.209	 1	 163.209	 769.414	 .000	 .986	 769.414	 1.000	
Training	 10.970	 1	 10.970	 51.716	 .000	 .825	 51.716	 1.000	
HighLow	 .622	 1	 .622	 2.932	 .115	 .210	 2.932	 .346	
Training		
HighLow	
.025	 1	 .025	 .117	 .738	 .011	 .117	 .061	
Error	 2.333	 11	 .212		 	 	 	 	
Total	 201.000	 15		 	 	 	 	 	
Corrected	
Total	




















5.762a	 1	 5.762	 17.286	 .009	 .776	 17.286	 .908	
Intercept	 88.048	 1	 88.048	 264.143	 .000	 .981	 264.143	 1.000	
Training	 5.762	 1	 5.762	 17.286	 .009	 .776	 17.286	 .908	
Error	 1.667	 5	 .333	 	 	 	 	 	
Total	 104.000	 7	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Corrected	
Total	









Crew	training	provided	 Mean	 Std.	Deviation	 N	
Yes	 4.0000	 .00000	 5	
No	 2.3333	 .57735	 3	























5.208a	 1	 5.208	 46.875	 .000	 .887	 46.875	 1.000	
Intercept	 75.208	 1	 75.208	 676.875	 .000	 .991	 676.875	 1.000	
Training	 5.208	 1	 5.208	 46.875	 .000	 .887	 46.875	 1.000	
Error	 .667	 6	 .111	 	 	 	 	 	
Total	 97.000	 8	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Corrected	
Total	























































































































































































































Valid	 Yes	 6	 15.0	 15.0	 15.0	
No	 34	 85.0	 85.0	 100.0	























Valid	 Yes	 13	 32.5	 32.5	 32.5	
No	 27	 67.5	 67.5	 100.0	

















Valid	 Yes	 23	 57.5	 57.5	 57.5	
No	 17	 42.5	 42.5	 100.0	
















Valid	 Yes	 32	 80.0	 80.0	 80.0	
No	 8	 20.0	 20.0	 100.0	
























Valid	 Strongly	Agree	 20	 50.0	 50.0	 50.0	
Somewhat	
Agree	
15	 37.5	 37.5	 87.5	
Neutral	 5	 12.5	 12.5	 100.0	
























Valid	 Strongly	Agree	 27	 67.5	 67.5	 67.5	
Somewhat	
Agree	
9	 22.5	 22.5	 90.0	
Somewhat	
Disagree	
4	 10.0	 10.0	 100.0	




















Valid	 Strongly	Agree	 6	 15.0	 15.0	 15.0	
Somewhat	
Agree	
17	 42.5	 42.5	 57.5	
Neutral	 11	 27.5	 27.5	 85.0	
Somewhat	
Disagree	
3	 7.5	 7.5	 92.5	
Strongly		
Disagree	
3	 7.5	 7.5	 100.0	


























Valid	 Strongly	Agree	 17	 42.5	 42.5	 42.5	
Somewhat	
Agree	
15	 37.5	 37.5	 80.0	
Neutral	 3	 7.5	 7.5	 87.5	
Somewhat	
Disagree	
5	 12.5	 12.5	 100.0	




















22	 55.0	 55.0	 55.0	
Somewhat	
Agree	
10	 25.0	 25.0	 80.0	
Neutral	 7	 17.5	 17.5	 97.5	
Somewhat	
Disagree	
1	 2.5	 2.5	 100.0	


























Valid	 	 1	 2.5	 2.5	 2.5	
Strongly	
Agree	
8	 20.0	 20.0	 22.5	
Somewhat	
Agree	
5	 12.5	 12.5	 35.0	
Neutral	 2	 5.0	 5.0	 40.0	
Somewhat	
Disagree	
13	 32.5	 32.5	 72.5	
Strongly		
Disagree	
11	 27.5	 27.5	 100.0	



















































No	 9	 2.666	 .70711	 .23570	 2.1231	 3.2102	 2.00	 4.00	 	
Yes	 11	 3.727	 .64667	 .19498	 3.2928	 4.1617	 2.00	 4.00	 	





	 	 .67420	 .15076	 2.9333	 3.5667	 	 	 	
Random	
Effects	











































5.568a	 1	 5.568	 12.250	 .003	 .405	 12.250	 .911	
Intercept	 202.368	 1	 202.368	 445.210	 .000	 .961	 445.210	 1.000	
CrewTrng	 5.568	 1	 5.568	 12.250	 .003	 .405	 12.250	 .911	
Error	 8.182	 18	 .455	 	 	 	 	 	
Total	 225.000	 20	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Corrected	
Total	















	 Mean	 Std.	Deviation	 N	
High	Altitude	Scenario	 3.2500	 .85070	 20	
Crew	Training	Received	 .5500	 .51042	 20	
Problem	diagnosis	 3.6000	 1.14248	 20	
Pitch	control	 3.5000	 1.10024	 20	
Roll	control	 3.8500	 .81273	 20	











































No	 10	 2.600	 .69921	 .22111	 2.0998	 	3.1002	 2.00	 4.00	 	
Yes	 10	 3.700	 .82327	 .26034	 3.1111	 	4.2889	 3.00	 5.00	 	





	 	 .76376	 .17078	 2.7912	 	3.5088	 	 	 	
Random	
Effects	


























6.050a	 1	 6.050	 10.371	 .005	 .366	 10.371	 .861	
Intercept	 198.450	 1	 198.450	 340.200	 .000	 .950	 340.200	 1.000	
CrewTrng	 6.050	 1	 6.050	 10.371	 .005	 .366	 10.371	 .861	
Error	 10.500	 18	 .583	 	 	 	 	 	
Total	 215.000	 20	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Corrected	
Total	

















	 Mean	 Std.	Deviation	 N	
Low	Altitude	Scenario	 3.1500	 .93330	 20	
Crew	Training	Received	 .5000	 .51299	 20	
Missed	approach	 2.8000	 1.10501	 20	
Checklist	procedures	 3.1500	 .98809	 20	
Time	Management	 3.1500	 1.03999	 20	
Fuel	Management	 3.2500	 .91047	 20	
































Crew	Training	Received	 Mean	 Std.	Deviation	 N	
No	 2.5789	 .60698	 19	
Yes	 3.7143	 .71714	 21	







No	 Mean	 2.6667	 2.6000	
N	 9.0	 10.0	
Std.	Deviation	 .70711	 .69921	
Yes	 Mean	 3.7273	 3.7000	
N	 11.0	 10.0	
Std.	Deviation	 .64667	 .82327	





















.140	 10	 .892	 .02727	 -.4072	 .4617	
Low	to	
HIgh	
























.283	 8	 .784	 .06667	 -.4769	 .6102	
Low	to	
High	































12.858a	 1	 12.858	 28.881	 .000	 .432	 28.881	 .999	
Intercept	 395.058	 1	 395.058	 887.387	 .000	 .959	 887.387	 1.000	
CrewTrng	 12.858	 1	 12.858	 28.881	 .000	 .432	 28.881	 .999	
Error	 16.917	 38	 .445	 	 	 	 	 	
Total	 433.000	 40	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Corrected	
Total	





















12.858	 1	 12.858	 28.881	 .000	
Within	Groups	 16.917	 38	 .445	 	 	





.226	 1	 .226	 .877	 .355	
Within	Groups	 9.774	 38	 .257	 	 	





1.684	 1	 1.684	 2.410	 .129	
Within	Groups	 25.158	 36	 .699	 	 	





.095	 1	 .095	 .367	 .548	
Within	Groups	 9.880	 38	 .260	 	 	



























-3.024	 18	 .007	 -.42105	 -.7136	 -.1285	
Crew	
Training	




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Levene	Statistic	 df1	 df2	 Sig.	
.674	 1	 18	 .422	
Regression	ANOVA	High	Altitude	Factors	
Model	 Sum	of	Squares	 df	 Mean	Square	 F	 Sig.	
1	 Regression	 5.568	 1	 5.568	 12.250	 .003b	
Residual	 8.182	 18	 .455	
Total	 13.750	 19	
2	 Regression	 10.748	 5	 2.150	 10.024	 .000c	


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F	 df1	 df2	 Sig.	





Model	 Sum	of	Squares	 df	 Mean	Square	 F	 Sig.	
1	 Regression	 6.050	 1	 6.050	 10.371	 .005b	
Residual	 10.500	 18	 .583	
Total	 16.550	 19	
2	 Regression	 15.367	 6	 2.561	 28.133	 .000c	






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F	 df1	 df2	 Sig.	
.046	 1	 38	 .831	
Tests	the	null	hypothesis	that	the	error	variance	of	the	dependent	variable	is	equal	
across	groups.	
a. Design:	Intercept	+	Crew	Training
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